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To address how technological progress in ￿nancial intermediation a⁄ects the
economy, a costly-state veri￿cation framework is embedded into the standard
growth model. The framework has two novel ingredients. First, ￿rms di⁄er in
the risk/return combinations that they o⁄er. Second, the e¢ cacy of monitoring
depends upon the amount of resources invested in the activity. A ￿nancial theory
of ￿rm size results. Undeserving ￿rms are over ￿nanced, deserving ones under
funded. Technological advance in intermediation leads to more capital accumula-
tion and a redirection of funds away from unproductive ￿rms toward productive
ones. With continued progress, the economy approaches its ￿rst-best equilibrium.
(JEL E13, O11, O16)
Keywords: costly state veri￿cation, economic development, ￿nancial interme-
diation
Financial development ￿accelerates economic growth and improves economic performance
to the extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i.e. to the place in
the economic system where the funds will earn the highest social return,￿ noted Raymond
W. Goldsmith (1969, p. 400) some thirty ￿ve years ago. Information production plays a
0 Greenwood: Department of Economics, McNeil Blg 160, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
14627; Sanchez: Research Department, The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and The Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166-0442 (email: juan.m.sanchez78@gmail.com); Wang:
Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011 (email: chewang@iastate.edu) and School
of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai, China 200433. Robert E. Lucas, Rodi Manuelli, Diego Restuccia
and Stephen Williamson are thanked for help. The authors also express their appreciation to three referees
for useful advice. Financial support from the NSF (award number 0647766) is gratefully acknowledged. The
proofs for all lemmas and propositions are contained in Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2009) includes a
quantitative investigation of the model presented here. The proofs can also be downloaded from the Review￿ s
website. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1key role in this process of steering of funds to the highest valued users. If the costs of
information production drop, then ￿nancial intermediation should become more e¢ cient
with an associated improvement in economic performance.
Improvements in the e¢ ciency of ￿nancial intermediation, due to improved information
production, are likely to reduce the spread between the internal rate of return on investment
in ￿rms and the rate of return on savings received by savers. The spread between these
returns re￿ ects the costs of intermediation. This spread will include the ex post information
costs of policing investments, and the costs of the misappropriation of savers￿funds by
management, unions, etc., that arise in a world with imperfect information. There may be
no change in the rate of return earned by savers over time, because aggregate savings will
adjust in equilibrium so that this return re￿ ects savers￿rates of time preference. If the wedge
between the internal rate of return earned by ￿rms and the rate of return received by savers
falls, due to more e⁄ective intermediation, then both the economy￿ s capital stock and income
should rise. Additionally, if capital is redirected away from the less productive investment
opportunities in the economy toward more productive ones then the economy￿ s output will
rise further and productivity move up. In fact, empirical research strongly suggests that
￿nancial development has a causal e⁄ect on economic development￿ see Ross Levine (2008)
for a masterful survey. Speci￿cally, ￿nancial development leads to higher rates of growth in
the capital stock, income and productivity.
A general equilibrium model of ￿rm ￿nance, with competitive intermediation, is pre-
sented to address the impact that ￿nancial intermediation has on economic development.
At the heart of the framework developed here is a costly-state veri￿cation paradigm that has
its roots in classic work by Robert M. Townsend (1979) and Stephen D. Williamson (1986).
The model here has two novel ingredients, though. First, in the standard costly-state veri￿-
cation paradigm, the realized return on a ￿rm￿ s investment activity is private information.
This return can be monitored, but the outcome of this auditing process is deterministic:
once monitoring takes place, the true state of the world is revealed with certainty. This is
true whether or not a deterministic decision rule for monitoring is employed, as in Townsend
2(1979) or Williamson (1986, 1987), or a stochastic one is used, as in Ben Bernanke and Mark
Gertler (1989) or John H. Boyd and Bruce D. Smith (1994)￿ see also Townsend (1979, Sec-
tion 4). By contrast, in the current setup the outcome of monitoring is random. Speci￿cally,
the probability of detecting malfeasance depends upon the amount of resources devoted to
policing the returns on a project and the e¢ ciency of the monitoring technology. In the
model a project￿ s funding and level of monitoring will be jointly determined. The infor-
mation asymmetry between the ￿rm and the intermediary gives the ￿rm an opportunity to
exploit its private knowledge about the realization of the investment return. In particular,
it can extract rents from the intermediary, and hence savers.
Second, a ￿rm￿ s production technology is subject to idiosyncratic randomness. This is
true in the standard costly-state veri￿cation framework as well. Here, though, there is a
distribution across ￿rms over the distribution of these returns. In particular, some ￿rms
may have investment projects that o⁄er low expected returns with little variance, while
others may have projects that yield high expected returns with a large variance.
Two key features in the analysis follow from these ingredients. First, the setup yields
a ￿nance-based theory of the equilibrium size distribution for ￿rms. This theory derives
from the facts that: (a) investment opportunities di⁄er in the expected returns and levels of
risk that they o⁄er and (b) producing information about these returns is costly. A simple
threshold rule for funding results. All ￿rms with an expected return at least as great as
the cost of raising capital are funded. Funding is increasing in a ￿rm￿ s expected return,
and is decreasing in its risk. Loan size is determinate for a given type of project because
the costs of ￿nancing a project are increasing and convex in the level of the monitoring
activity. Thus, high mean projects receive limited funding because the costs of monitoring
will rise disproportionately with loan size. The riskier a project is, the bigger is the di⁄erence
between the returns in good and bad states. This increases the incentive for a ￿rm to low-
ball its earnings in good states. Hence, more diligent monitoring will be required, which
increases its ￿nancing cost. In an abstract sense, one could think that the diminishing
returns in information production modeled here provide a microfoundation for Robert E.
3Lucas￿ s (1978) span of control model.
Second, the framework provides a link between the e¢ ciency of the ￿nancial system and
the level of economic activity. Such a tie was developed earlier in the models of Valerie
R. Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic (1990), Levine (1991),
and Albert Marcet and Ramon Marimon (1992). The analysis here provides a crystal clear
delineation of the Goldsmith (1969) mechanism, however. It stresses the connection between
the state of technological development in the ￿nancial sector, on the one hand, and capital
accumulation, both along the extensive and intensive margins, on the other. If technological
improvement in the ￿nancial sector occurs at a faster pace than in the rest of the economy,
then ￿nancial intermediation becomes more e¢ cient. Loans are monitored more diligently
and the rents earned by ￿rms shrink. Additionally, lending activity will change along both
extensive and intensive margins. Projects with high (low) expected returns will now receive
more (less) funds. Those investments with the lowest expected returns will be cut. At high
levels of e¢ ciency in the ￿nancial sector the economy approaches the ￿rst-best equilibrium
achieved in a world without informational frictions. This reallocation e⁄ect distinguishes
the analysis from earlier research by Shankha Chakraborty and Amartya Lahiri (2007) and
Aubhik Khan (2001) that also embed the standard costly-state veri￿cation framework into
a growth model. In these frameworks all ￿rms receive the same amount of capital.
I The Environment
Imagine a world resting in a steady state that is made up of three types of agents: con-
sumer/workers, ￿rms and ￿nancial intermediaries. In a nutshell, ￿rms produce output using
capital and labor. The consumer/worker supplies the labor, and intermediaries, the capital.
All funding for capital must be raised outside of the ￿rm. Financial intermediaries obtain
the funds for capital from consumer/workers. They also use labor in their lending activity.
Output is used for consumption by consumer/workers and for investment in capital by in-
termediaries. The behavior of ￿rms and intermediaries will now be described in more detail.
4The consumer/worker plays a more passive role in the analysis, which is relegated into the
background by assuming that he supplies one unit of labor and saves at some ￿xed interest
rate, b r.1
II Firms




where k and l represent the inputs of capital and labor used in production. The variable
￿ gives the productivity level of the ￿rm￿ s production process. Productivity is a random
variable drawn from a two-point vector ￿ ￿ (￿1;￿2) with ￿1 < ￿2. Let Pr(￿ = ￿1) = ￿1
and Pr(￿ = ￿2) = ￿2 = 1 ￿ ￿1. The mean and variance of ￿ are given by ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2 and
￿1￿2(￿1 ￿ ￿2)2, respectively. Thus, for a given set of probabilities these statistics di⁄er in
accordance with the values speci￿ed for ￿1 and ￿2. The realized value of ￿ is the ￿rm￿ s
private information.
Now, the productivity vector, ￿, di⁄ers across ￿rms. In particular, suppose that ￿rms
in the economy are distributed over productivities in line with the distribution function
F : T ! [0;1], where T ￿ R2
+ and
F(x;y) = Pr(￿1 ￿ x;￿2 ￿ y).
Think of this distribution as somehow specifying a trade-o⁄between the mean and variance
of project returns. Due to technological progress in the production sector of the economy,
this distribution will evolve over time. Figure 1 plots an illustrative density function for F
in mean/variance space.
The ￿rm borrows capital, k, from the intermediary before it observes the technology
shock, ￿. It does this with both parties knowing its type, ￿. It can employ labor, at the
1 Think about a representative consumer with time separable preferences over consumption. The steady




Figure 1: Illustrative distribution for ￿rm type in mean/variance space
wage rate w, after it sees the realization for ￿. In order to ￿nance its use of capital the ￿rm
must enter into a contract with a ￿nancial intermediary. Last, note that a ￿rm￿ s production
is governed by constant returns to scale. In the absence of ￿nancial market frictions no rents
would be earned on production. Additionally, in a frictionless world only ￿rms o⁄ering the
highest expected return would be funded. With ￿nancial market frictions, deserving projects
are underfunded, while undeserving projects are simultaneously over funded.
A Pro￿t Maximization by Firms
Consider the problem faced by a ￿rm that receives a loan in terms of capital in the amount k.
The ￿rm hires labor after it sees the realization of its technology shock, ￿. It will do this in
a manner so as to maximize its pro￿ts. In other words, the ￿rm will solve the maximization
problem shown below.

















Substituting the solution for l into the maximand and solving yields the unit return function,
R(￿;w), or




Think about ri = R(￿i;w) as giving the rate of return on a unit of capital invested in the
￿rm given that state ￿i occurs. The expected rate of return will be ￿1r1 + ￿2r2, while the
variance reads ￿1￿2(r1 ￿ r2)2.
III Financial Intermediaries
There is a competitive intermediation sector that borrows funds from consumers and lends
capital to ￿rms. While the intermediary knows a ￿rm￿ s type it cannot observe the state of
a ￿rm￿ s business either costlessly or perfectly. That is, the intermediary cannot costlessly
observe ￿, o and l. The ￿rm will make a report to the intermediary about its business
situation. The intermediary can devote some resources in order to assess the veracity of this
report. The payments, p, from a ￿rm to the intermediary will be conditioned both upon the
report made by the former, and the outcome of any monitoring activity done by the latter.
By channelling funds through ￿nancial intermediaries consumers avoid a costly duplication
of monitoring e⁄ort that would occur in an equilibrium with direct lending between them
and ￿rms￿ see Williamson (1986) for more detail. Likewise, in the environment under study,
it is optimal for a ￿rm to borrow from only one intermediary at a time.
Suppose a ￿rm reports that the productivity on its project in a given period is ￿j, which
may di⁄er from the true state ￿i. The intermediary can devote resources, mj, to verify this
7claim. The probability of detecting fraud is increasing in the amount of resources devoted
to this activity. In particular, let Pij(mj=k) denote the probability that the ￿rm is caught
cheating conditional on the following: (1) the true realization of productivity is ￿i; (2) the
￿rm makes a report of ￿j; (3) the intermediary spends mj in monitoring; (4) the total
amount of borrowing is k (which represents the size of the project). The function Pij(mj=k)
is assumed to be monotonically increasing in mj=k. Additionally, let Pij(mj=k) = 0 if the
￿rm truthfully reports that its type is ￿i. Any lender to the ￿rm must monitor the whole
project to detect cheating, because his claim to pro￿ts will depend on the total level of
receipts vis ￿ vis the total amount of disbursements paid out to others. Borrowing through
a single intermediary then avoids a costly duplication of monitoring e⁄ort.
A convenient formulation for Pij(mj=k) is
Pij(mj=k) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1 ￿ 1
(￿mj=k)  < 1; with 0 <   < 1;
for a report ￿j 6= ￿i and mj=k > 1=￿;
0;
for a report ￿j = ￿i or mj=k ￿ 1=￿:
To guarantee that Pij(mj=k) ￿ 0, this speci￿cation requires that some threshold level of
monitoring, mj > k=￿, must be exceeded to detect cheating. Note that this threshold level
of monitoring can be made arbitrarily small by picking a large enough value for ". Figure 2
makes this clear, while illustrating the function Pij(mj=k).
Monitoring is a produced good, measured in units of consumption. The production of
monitoring is project speci￿c. Monitoring produced for detecting fraud in one project cannot
be used in a di⁄erent one. Let monitoring be produced in line with the production function
m = zl
1=￿
m ; with 0 ￿ 1=￿ ￿ 1,
where lm represents the amount of labor employed in this activity. The cost function,
C(m=z;w), associated with monitoring is given by
C(m=z;w) = w(m=z)
￿:



















































































for z = 1.25
for z = 1.0
Figure 2: The functions Pij(mj=k) and C(m=z;w)=w Notes: " = 100,   = 0:52, and
￿ = 1:86.
Costs are linear in wages, w. With diminishing returns to scale in production (1=￿ < 1), the
cost function is increasing and convex in the amount of monitoring, m, and decreasing and
convex in the state of the monitoring production technology, z. Figure 2 portrays the cost
of monitoring in terms of labor, or plots C(m=z;w)=w.
Now, exactly which ￿rms are funded depends on three things: (1) the ￿rm￿ s type, ￿;
(2) the state of the monitoring production technology in the ￿nancial intermediation sector,
z; (3) the expense of monitoring e⁄ort as re￿ ected by the wage, w. As will be seen, when
the variance of a ￿rm￿ s project becomes larger, the informational problems associated with
contracting become more severe. Therefore, high variance projects are less likely to get
funded, ceteris paribus.
IV The Financial Contract
A contract between a ￿rm and an intermediary is summarized by the quadruple fk;pj;pij;mjg.
Here k represents the amount of capital lent by the intermediary to the ￿rm, pj is the ￿rm￿ s
9payment to the intermediary if it reports ￿j and is not found cheating, pij is payment to the
bank if the borrower reports ￿j and monitoring reveals that productivity is ￿i 6= ￿j, and mj
is the intermediary￿ s monitoring e⁄ort when ￿j is reported. Denote the value of the ￿rm￿ s
outside option by v. The value for v is determined in competitive equilibrium.
The intermediary chooses the details of the ￿nancial contract, fk;pj;pij;mjg, to max-
imize its pro￿ts. The contract is designed to have two features: (1) it entices truthful
reporting by ￿rms; (2) it o⁄ers ￿rms an expected return of v. The optimization problem is
(P2) I(￿;v) ￿ max
p1;p2;p12;p21;m1;m2;k




(3) p1 ￿ r1k;
(4) p2 ￿ r2k;
(5) p12 ￿ r1k;
(6) p21 ￿ r2k;
(7) [1 ￿ P12(m2=k)](r1k ￿ p2) + P12(m2=k)(r1k ￿ p12) ￿ r1k ￿ p1;
(8) [1 ￿ P21(m1=k)](r2k ￿ p1) + P21(m1=k)(r2k ￿ p21) ￿ r2k ￿ p2;
and
(9) ￿1(r1k ￿ p1) + ￿2(r2k ￿ p2) = v:
Note that the cost of capital, e r, is given by e r = b r + ￿; i.e., the interest paid to investors
plus the depreciation on capital. The ￿rst four constraints just say the intermediary cannot
demand more than the ￿rm earns; that is, the ￿rm has limited liability. Equations (7) and (8)
10are the incentive-compatibility constraints. Take (8). This simply states that the expected
return to the ￿rm from reporting state one when it actually is in state two, as given by the
left-hand side, must be less than telling the truth, as represented by the right-hand side.
Observe that the constraint set is not convex due to the way that m1 enters (8). Therefore,
the second-order conditions for the maximization problem are important to consider. The
last constraint (9) speci￿es that the contract must o⁄er the ￿rm an expected return equal to
v, its option value outside. A ￿rm￿ s outside option is the expected return that it could earn
on a loan from another intermediary. This will be pinned down in equilibrium. Finally, note
the solution for fpj;pij;mj;kg is contingent upon the ￿rm￿ s type, ￿ = (￿1;￿2). To conserve
on notation, this dependence is generally suppressed.
The lemma below characterizes the solution to the above optimization problem.
Lemma 1 (Terms of the Contract) The solution to problem (P2) is described by:
1. The size of the loan from the intermediary to the ￿rm, k, is
(10) k =
v
￿2(r2 ￿ r1)[1 ￿ P21(m1=k)]
:
2. The amount of monitoring per unit of capital when the ￿rm reports a bad state, m1=k,
solves the problem
(P3) I(￿;v) ￿ max
m1=k








where k can be eliminated using (10) above.
(a) Monitoring in the bad state is simply given by
m1 = (m1=k)k;
where m1=k solves (P3).
(b) The intermediary does not monitor when the ￿rm reports a good state so that
(11) m2 = 0:
3. The payment schedule is
(12) p1 = r1k;
11(13) p2 = r2k ￿ v=￿2;
(14) p12 = r1k;
(15) p21 = r2k:
Proof. See Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2009, Appendix), which contains proofs for
all of the lemmas and propositions.
It is intuitive that there are no bene￿ts to the ￿rm from claiming a better outcome than it
actually realizes, since it will only have to pay the intermediary more. Therefore, cheating is
only a problem in the high state. The intermediary would like to reduce the ￿rm￿ s incentive
to report being in the low state when it is in a high state. So, suppose the ￿rm reports a
low state. If cheating is not detected, then the ￿rm pays all of the revenue (minus labor
cost) that would be realized in the low state￿ see (12). If the ￿rm is caught cheating, then
it must surrender all of the revenue (sans labor cost) that it earns in the high state￿ see
(15). Note that due to the incentive-compatibility constraints a false report will never occur
so that the payments shown by (14) and (15) do not occur in equilibrium.
The contract speci￿es that the intermediary should only monitor the ￿rm when it reports
a bad outcome (state 1) on its project￿ see (11). Monitoring in the low state is done to
maximize the intermediary￿ s pro￿ts, subject to the incentive-compatibility cum promise-
keeping constraint (10), as problem (P3) dictates. Note that the higher is the value of the
￿rm, v, the bigger must be the loan, k, to satisfy the incentive-compatibility cum promise-
keeping constraint (10). This constraint (10) ensures that the contract provides the ￿rm an
expected return equal to what it would earn if it misrepresented the outcome in the good
state, ￿2(r2￿r1)[1￿P21(m1=k)]k. Furthermore, this expected return is set equal to the ￿rm￿ s
outside option, v. The size of the loan, k, is increasing in the amount of monitoring that
occurs in the low state, m1=k. This happens because the probability of the ￿rm not getting
caught from misrepresenting its revenues, 1￿P21(m1=k), is decreasing in the intermediary￿ s
monitoring activity.
12Now, a ￿nancial contract will be o⁄ered by an intermediary to a ￿rm only if it yields
the former nonnegative pro￿ts, I(￿;v) ￿ 0. Suppose that r1 < e r. A necessary condition
for a contract to yield nonnegative pro￿ts is for the intermediary to devote more than the
minimal level of resources per unit of funds lent, 1=￿, to monitoring a report of a bad state.
If this is not done, the ￿rm will always claim that it is in the low state, and the intermediary
can only earn a loss on the contract. Brie￿ y consider the case where r1 ￿ e r. Here the ￿rm￿ s
return on capital in its worst state of nature is at least as large as the cost of capital, e r.
Firms would desire to borrow an in￿nite amount of capital. An equilibrium will not exist.
Assumption: r1 = R(￿1;w) < e r = b r + ￿, for all ￿rm types.
Later, a lower bound on the level of productivity in the ￿nancial sector, ￿, will be imposed
that guarantees that this assumption holds whenever z > ￿. This lower bound ensures that
the equilibrium wage, w, is high enough so that the assumption will always hold￿ see (2).
Lemma 2 (Interior solution for monitoring) m1=k > 1=￿, for all v > 0.
V Competitive Financial Intermediation
In the economy there is perfect competition in the ￿nancial sector. Consequently, an inter-
mediary must o⁄er a contract that maximizes a ￿rm￿ s value, subject to the restriction that
the former does not incur a loss. If an intermediary failed to do so it would be undercut
by others. The upshot is that intermediaries will make zero pro￿ts on each type of loan.
Furthermore, for a ￿rm to produce, it must make positive pro￿ts too. It is intuitive that for
all this to happen a project must o⁄er some potential for a surplus or that ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 > e r;
i.e., the expected return on capital must exceed its cost. Assume this. The value of a ￿rm,
v, is then determined by the condition
(16) v = V (￿) ￿ argmax
x fx : I(￿;x) = 0g:
The implications of perfect competition will now be analyzed. Key questions are: (ii) What
will be the loan size? (ii) Which ￿rms will get funded?
13The size of a loan for a project, k, can now be determined. To do this, substitute (10)
in Problem (P3) and solve for the optimal level of monitoring, m1=k. Plug this solution
for monitoring in the objective function for (P3) to obtain a formula for I(￿;v).1 Next,
compute v using condition (16). Substituting the obtained formulae for m1=k and v into
(10) yields
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1
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￿(￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r)
(￿+ )=( ￿￿ )(￿1w)





Equation (17) gives a determinate loan size for each type of funded project. Furthermore,
funding is increasing in a project￿ s expected return and is decreasing in its volatility.
Lemma 3 (Loan size) The level of investment in a ￿rm, k, is increasing in its expected
net return, ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r, and the state of technology in the ￿nancial sector, z, and is
decreasing in the variance of the return, r2 ￿ r1 (holding the wage rate, w, ￿xed).
Attention will now be directed toward determining which projects will be funded. Con-
sider the set of ￿rms, A(w), de￿ned by
(18) A(w) ￿ f￿ : ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r > 0g:
Intuitively, one might expect that this set of projects will be funded in equilibrium because
they o⁄er an expected return on capital, ￿1r1 + ￿2r2, that is greater than its user cost, e r.
This turns out to be true. The contracting problem (P2) implies that the ￿rm will never
make negative pro￿ts, given (3) to (6). The construction of equation (17) suggests that the
intermediary will be able to make a loan in this situation, and not incur a loss.
1 The solution obtained for I(￿;v) is
I(￿;v) = ( ￿ + ￿ ￿  )(
1
 
)￿ =( ￿+￿￿ )(
1
 ￿ + ￿
)( ￿+￿)=( ￿+￿￿ )(￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r)( ￿+￿)=( ￿+￿￿ )
￿(￿1w)￿ =( ￿+￿￿ )[
(￿z) 
￿2(r2 ￿ r1)
]￿=( ￿+￿￿ )v￿=( ￿+￿￿ ) ￿ v:
This solution presumes that r1 < e r, so there is an interior solution for monitoring, and that ￿1r1+￿2r2 > e r.
It is easy to see that the intermediary￿ s pro￿t function, I(￿;v), is \ shaped with the following properties:
(i) I(￿;0) = 0; (ii) limv!0 @I(￿;v)=@v = 1; (iii) @2I(￿;v)=@v2 < 0; (iv) limv!1 I(￿;v) = ￿1. Therefore,
there is only one v > 0 that solves (16).
14Lemma 4 (The set of funded ￿rms) A necessary and su¢ cient condition for a type-￿ ￿rm
to be active or funded, or for k(￿) > 0;I(￿;V (￿)) = 0 and V (￿) > 0, is that ￿ 2 A(w).
Therefore, as was mentioned in the introduction, a simple threshold rule exists for funding,
as characterized by (18). Call A(w) the set of active ￿rms. From (2) it is easy to see that






2 ] ￿ e r > 0:
Observe that the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are decreasing in wages. A type-￿ ￿rm will operate when
w < W(￿), and will not otherwise, where the cuto⁄ wage, W(￿), is speci￿ed by










So, the set of active projects A(w) can be expressed equivalently as
(20) A(w) = f￿ : w < W(￿)g.
The active set depends on the wage because ri = R(￿i;w). It contracts (expands) with a
rise (decrease) in the real wage, since R(￿i;w) is decreasing in w. In equilibrium the wage
rate, w, turns out to be increasing function of the state of technology in the ￿nancial sector,
z. Hence, the active set will shrink with technological improvement in the ￿nancial sector,
or a rise in z. This will become clearer in Section VII.
Figure 3 summarizes the discussion on funding. The left horizontal axes plot the expected
return for a project, while the right ones give its risk. As the expected return on a project
rises, more capital is allocated to it, as the ￿rst panel illustrates. (Note that the directions
of the x and y axes are speci￿c to each panel and are shown by the arrows.) The increase
in funding (or the scale of the ￿rm) is associated with higher monitoring costs given the
increasing, convex form of the cost function (fourth panel). The amount of monitoring done
per unit of capital is then economized on (third panel). As a consequence, the odds of
detecting fraud drop (second panel). In response the expected rents earned by the ￿rm rise
(￿fth panel).
As the risk associated with a project rises, its funding is slashed￿ see the ￿rst panel. When
the di⁄erence between the good and bad state widens there is more incentive for the ￿rm to
15falsify its earning. The intermediary therefore monitors more per unit of capital lent (third
panel). Total monitoring costs fall with risk, because the size of the loan is smaller (fourth
panel). The probability of detecting malfeasance therefore moves up since monitoring per
unit of capital is now higher (second panel). A ￿rm￿ s rents will fall with a rise in risk (￿fth
panel), because it receives a smaller loan and faces more vigilant policing.
VI Stationary Equilibrium
The focus of the analysis is on stationary equilibria. First, the labor-market-clearing condi-
tion for the model will be presented. Second, a de￿nition for a stationary equilibrium will
be given. Third, it will be demonstrated that a stationary equilibrium for the model exists.
On the demand side for labor, only ￿rms with ￿ 2 A(w) will be producing output. On
the supply side, recall that the economy has one unit of labor in aggregate. The labor-




[￿1l1(￿1;￿2) + ￿2l2(￿1;￿2) + ￿1lm1(￿1;￿2)]dF(￿1;￿2) = 1.
It is now time to take stock of the situation so far by presenting a de￿nition of the
equilibrium under study. It will be assumed that the economy rests in a stationary state
where the cost of capital is e r = b r + ￿.
De￿nition 1 Set the steady-state cost of capital at e r. A stationary competitive equilibrium is
described by a set of labor allocations, l and lm, a ￿nancial contract, fp1;p2;p12;p21;k;m1;m2g,
a set of active monitored ￿rms, A(w), ￿rm values v, and a wage rate, w, such that:
1. The ￿nancial intermediary o⁄ers a contract, fp1;p2;p12;p21;k;m1;m2g, which maxi-
mizes its pro￿ts, I, in accordance with (P2), given the cost of capital and wages, e r
and w, and the value of ￿rms, v. The intermediary hires labor for monitoring in the
amount lm = (m=z)￿.
2. The ￿nancial contract o⁄ered by the intermediary maximizes the value of a ￿rm, v, in
line with (16), given the prices e r and w.
3. A ￿rm is o⁄ered a contract if and only if it lies in the active set, A(w), as de￿ned by
(18), given e r and w. It hires labor, l, so as to maximize its pro￿ts in accordance with































Figure 3: The determination of ￿rm size as a function of the mean and standard deviation
of r = R(￿;w) Notes: The left horizontal axes plot the mean of r, while the right ones give
its standard deviation. The direction of an axis is shown by its arrow. The parameter values
used are: ￿ = 0:33;￿ = 0:07;￿ = 100;  = 0:52;￿ = 1:86;￿1 = ￿2 = 0:5;b r = 1=0:96 ￿ 1; and
w = 20.
174. The wage rate, w, is determined so that the labor market clears, in accordance with
(21).
When will an equilibrium exist for the economy under study? To address this question,
let ￿1 ￿ maxf￿1 : (￿1;￿2) 2 T , over all ￿2g. Next, de￿ne the constant ! by the equation
(22) R(￿1;!) = e r:
The constant ! speci￿es a lower bound on the feasible equilibrium wage rate.2 When w = !
for a type-(￿1;￿2) project it will happen that r1 = e r. In this situation the intermediary could
simply ask for a payment of r1k in both states of the world and engage in no monitoring. It
would earn zero pro￿ts. The ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts would be ￿2(r2 ￿ r1)k. It would desire a loan of
in￿nite size. Therefore, as the equilibrium wage, w, approaches ! from above the equilibrium
de￿ned above will eventually become tenuous.
The situation is portrayed in Figure 4, which graphs the demand and supply for labor.
The demand for labor is portrayed by the solid line labeled L. The properties of this demand
schedule are established during the course of the proof for Lemma 5￿ see Greenwood, Sanchez
and Wang (2009, Appendix). Demand is downward sloping in w. The question is whether
or not it will cross the vertical supply schedule for labor. Now, at a given wage rate, loan
size increases with more e¢ cient intermediation. This leads to more labor being demanded
when intermediation improves. In other words, it can be shown that the demand for labor
schedule rotates rightward with an upward movement in z. Now, de￿ne ￿ as the level of z
such that the demand curve intersects the supply curve at the point (1;!).
Lemma 5 (Existence of an equilibrium) There is a constant ￿ such that for all z > ￿ there
exists a stationary equilibrium for the economy.
2 The function R(￿;w) is continuous and strictly decreasing in w, with limw!0 R(￿;w) = 1, and
limw!1 R(￿;w) = 0; hence, ! is well de￿ned.
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z > z for L,
z = z for L,
Figure 4: Existence, demand and supply for labor
19VII The Impact of Technological Progress on the Econ-
omy
The primary goal of the analysis is to understand how technological advance in the ￿nancial
sector a⁄ects the economy. To this end, the impact that technological progress, in either the
￿nancial or production sector, has on the portfolio of funded projects will be characterized.
To develop some intuition for the economy under study, some special cases will be examined.
A Balanced Growth
In the ￿rst special case, technological progress in the ￿nancial sector proceeds in balance
with the rest of the economy. Speci￿cally, the economy may move along a balanced growth
path when the ￿
1=￿
i ￿ s grow at the common rate g1=￿ and z grows at rate g1=(1￿￿).3 There-
fore, Ft+1(￿1;￿2) = Ft(￿1=g;￿2=g). The salient features of this case are summarized by the
proposition below.
Proposition 1 (Balanced growth) Let the ￿
1=￿
i ￿ s grow at rate g1=￿ and z increases at rate
g1=(1￿￿). There exists a balanced growth path where the capital stock, k, wages, w, and rents,
v, will all grow at rate g1=(1￿￿). The amount of resources devoted to monitoring per unit of
capital, m1=k, remains constant.
In this situation the ￿nancial sector is not becoming more e¢ cient over time, relative to
the rest of the economy. The amount of monitoring done per unit of capital invested remains
constant over time. Thus, the probability of a ￿rm getting caught by misrepresenting a high
level of earnings, P21(m1=k), is constant over time too. For any particular project type, the
spread between the return on capital (net of labor costs) and its user cost, ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ e r,
is ￿xed over time. The existence of a balanced growth path results from the fact that
the probability of detection, P21(m1=k), depends on the employment of monitoring services
relative to the size of the loan.
3 In order to get a ￿xed interest rate assume that the consumer/worker has isoelastic preferences over
consumption. Then, in standard fashion, along a balanced growth path, b r = g￿=(1￿￿)=￿ ￿ 1, where ￿ is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
20B Unbalanced Growth
The above case suggests that for technological progress in the ￿nancial sector to have an
impact it must outpace advance in the rest of the economy. Suppose that this is the case.
Then, one would expect that as monitoring becomes more e¢ cient those projects o⁄ering
the lowest expected return will be cut.
Proposition 2 (Technological progress in ￿nancial intermediation) Consider z and z0 with
z < z0. Let w and w0 be the wage rates associated with z and z0, respectively. Then,
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An increase in z makes ￿nancial intermediation more e¢ cient. For any given wage rate, w,
the aggregate demand for labor will increase for two reasons. First, more capital will be
lent to each funded project. Second, more labor will also be hired by the intermediary to
monitor the project. Since the demand for labor rises, the wage rate must move up to clear
the labor market. This increase in wages causes the set of active projects, A(w), to shrink,
with the projects o⁄ering the lowest expected return being culled.
Alternatively, technological advance could occur in the production sector and not the
￿nancial one. Here, the lack of development in the ￿nancial sector will hinder growth in
the rest of the economy. Speci￿cally, technological advance in the production sector of the
economy will drive up wages. This leads to the costs of monitoring rising. Therefore, less
is done. This lack of scrutiny by intermediaries now allows ￿rms with marginal projects
o⁄ering low-expected returns to receive funding.
Proposition 3 (Technological progress in production) Suppose all the ￿
1=￿
i ￿ s increase by the
factor g1=￿, holding z ￿xed. Then, the set of active projects, A(w), expands with the new
projects o⁄ering lower expected returns than the old ones.
C E¢ cient Finance
An extreme example of Proposition 2 would be to assume that z grows forever. Then, the
￿nancial sector will become in￿nitely e¢ cient relative to the rest of the economy. This leads
to the fourth special case.
21Proposition 4 (E¢ cient ￿nance) Suppose T is a compact and countable subset of R2
+, with
a positive measure of projects for each type, ￿ = (￿1;￿2). Then,
1. lim




z!1m1=z = 0; for ￿ 2 A￿,
3. lim
z!1m1=k = 1 and lim
z!1P12(m1=k) = 1, for ￿ 2 A￿,
4. lim
z!1p2 = r2k; for ￿ 2 A￿,
5. lim



























As the cost of monitoring borrowers drops, the intermediation sector becomes increas-
ingly e¢ cient. The ￿nancial intermediary can then perfectly police loan payments without
devoting a signi￿cant amount of resources in terms of labor to this activity, as points (2)
and (3) in the proposition make clear. Since ￿rms are operating constant-returns-to-scale
production technologies, no rents will accrue on their activity￿ see point (5). Firms must
pay the full marginal product of capital to the intermediary￿ point (4). That is, the spread
between a ￿rm￿ s internal rate of return (before depreciation), ￿1r1 + ￿2r2 ￿ ￿, and the user
cost of capital, e r = b r+￿, vanishes, where the latter is made of the interest paid to savors, b r,
and rate of depreciation, ￿. In this world only projects with the highest return are ￿nanced,
as point (1) states, even though they may be the most risky. In the aggregate any idio-
syncratic project risk washes out. Therefore, in the absence of a contracting problem, only
the mean return on investment matters. And, with constant-returns-to-scale technologies
everything should be directed to the most pro￿table opportunity. The wage rate, w￿, and
aggregate capital stock, k￿, in the e¢ cient economy are determined in standard fashion by
22the conditions that the expected marginal product of capital for the most pro￿table projects
must equal the user cost of capital, e r, and the fact that the labor market must clear. These
two conditions yield (24) and (23). (By comparison, consider the standard deterministic
growth model with the production technology o = ￿k￿l1￿￿ and one unit of aggregate labor.
Here w￿ ￿ ￿￿=(1￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(￿
1=￿=e r)￿=(1￿￿) and k￿ ￿ (￿=e r)1=(1￿￿)(￿
1=￿)
￿=(1￿￿). The di⁄erences
in the formulae are due to two facts that pertain to the current setting: (i) the best projects
from a portfolio T are chosen; (ii) there is uncertainty in ￿.)
VIII Conclusions
What is the link between the state of ￿nancial intermediation and economic development?
This question is explored here by embedding a costly-state veri￿cation framework into the
standard neoclassical growth paradigm. The model has two novel ingredients. As in the
standard costly-state veri￿cation paradigm, the ex post return on a project is private in-
formation and an intermediary can audit the reported return. The ￿rst ingredient is that
likelihood of a successful audit is increasing and concave in the amount of resources devoted
to monitoring. The cost of auditing is increasing and convex in the amount of resources
spent on this activity. Second, there is a distribution over ￿rm type, each type o⁄ering a
di⁄erent combination of risk and return.
Two key features follow from these ingredients. First, a ￿nancial theory of ￿rm size
results. All ￿rms are funded that earn an expected return greater than the cost of raising
capital from savers. Funding is increasing in a project￿ s expected return and decreasing in
its variance. The size of a ￿rm is limited by diminishing returns in information production.
Second, a Goldsmithian (1969) link is created between the state of ￿nancial development
and economic development. The presence of informational frictions leads to a distortion
between the expected marginal product of capital and its user cost, the interest paid to
savers plus capital consumption. This distortion is modelled endogenously here. As the
e¢ cacy of auditing increases, due to technological progress in the ￿nancial sector, the size
of this distortion shrinks. The upshot is an increase in the economy￿ s income. Intuitively,
23the rise in income derives from three e⁄ects: (a) as the spread shrinks there is more overall
capital accumulation in the economy; (b) capital is redirected toward the most productive
investment opportunities in the economy; (c) less labor is required to monitor loans, which
frees up resources for the economy.
There are two natural extensions of the above framework. The ￿rst would be to allow
for long-term contracts. On this, Wang (2005) presents a dynamic costly-state veri￿cation
model, while Anthony A. Smith and Wang (2006) embed a long-term contracting framework
into a model of ￿nancial intermediation. The properties of dynamic contracting for ￿rm
￿nance in worlds with private information have been examined by Gian Luca Clementi and
Hugo A. Hopenhayn (2006) and Vincenzo Quadrini (2004). The use of dynamic contracts
could mitigate the informational problems discussed here. How much is an open question.
In a competitive world, such contracts may be severely limited by the ability of each party
to leave the relationship at any point in time and seek a better partner.
Second, a dynamic contracting version of the developed framework could be taken to
the cross-country data to measure the importance of ￿nancial intermediation in economy
development. Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2009) do this for the static contracting case
emphasized here. They ￿nd that ￿nancial intermediation plays a quantitatively important
role in economic development. This ￿nding is in accord with recent quantitative work by
others using a variety of di⁄erent models; e.g., Pedro S, Amaral and Erwin Quintin (forth),
Francisco J. Buera, Joseph P. Kaboski and Yongseok Shin (2009), Rui Castro, Gian Luca
Clementi and Glenn M. MacDonald (2009), Andres Erosa and Ana Hidalgo Cabrillana (2008)
and Townsend and Kenichi Ueda (2006).4 Such an extension could be melded together
with a Hopenhayn and Richard Rogerson (1993) industry-dynamics model. An interesting
question is whether such a framework is capable of delivering large resource misallocations
4 Castro, Clementi and MacDonald (2009) undertake a quantitative analysis within the context of a
costly-state falsi￿cation model. It is particularly interesting for the analysis undertaken here. They explain
why per-capita income co-varies positively with the PPP-adjusted investment rate, and negatively with the
the relative price of capital goods. This happens because the capital goods sector is risky, implying that the
costs of ￿nance are high in countries with poor investor protection. The current framework would generate
a similar prediction.
24across ￿rms, as emphasized by Diego Restuccia and Rogerson (2008).
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